Journal of Accountancy
Volume 56

Issue 2

Article 3

8-1933

Capital flexibility
A. C. Littleton

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Littleton, A. C. (1933) "Capital flexibility," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 56 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol56/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Capital Flexibility
By A. C. Littleton

During the recent cycle of inflation and deflation the capital
problems of corporations have been emphasized in many ways.
The asset write-ups and stock dividends of the ’20’s and the
asset write-downs and reductions of stated capital of the ’30’s, as
well as numerous other practices, were for the most part attempts
to harmonize inflexible capital and changing asset values.
But this apparent search for flexibility has not gone forward
without criticism. Abuses have been perceived which raise
questions of doubt concerning the desirability of continued
departures from the older methods of financing. For example,
many corporations themselves are beginning to question the
efficacy of no-par stock. And yet the objective of capital flexi
bility in itself still seems desirable.

Note the background of the term “capital stock.” That part
of the owner’s property which was active in his business affairs
was at first very probably recorded (if at all) in a simple personal
account—a credit to some sort of “master’s account” by the
slave or agent who was responsible for attending to business
affairs. From the agent’s point of view he “owed” the master
for the sum entrusted; the master saw only a sum of money
working in his behalf. To the latter this would be his “principal
sum” and as the adjective came to be used elliptically as a sub
stantive it would be thought of as his “principal.” If the term
had in this form been attached to his account, the title might be
expected to have become “master’s principal.” When we see
that the old Latin root word for the adjective “principal” was
caput (head) and that this word evolved into the mediaeval
Latin capitalis and into the mediaeval Italian cavedale, and finally
into the English capital, it is not hard to convince ourselves that
“master’s capital” or “John Jones, capital” probably grew out
of such a past.
Shift the scene to the seventeenth century. The trading
companies, such as the East India Company and others, devel
oped a species of enlarged partnerships. Each participant con
tributed from his stock of goods. The united contributions
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constituted a stock of goods which were owned jointly by the
participants, in other words, a “joint-stock.” Soon therefore
“cash debitor to stock” was a typical opening entry. (For
example, Dafforne, Merchants Mirriour, 1634, and Monteage
Debtor and Creditor Made Easie, 1690.) “Stock” was here
representative of the goods or economic capital held in joint-stock.
Presently the two terms crept together. For example, an act
of parliament in 1697 regarding the Bank of England ( 8 & 9 W
& M c. 20) mentions “the common, capital, and principal stock
of the said Governor and Company ------.” At present the
combined terms “capital stock” are in constant use, but we
seldom appreciate their inconsistency. “Stock” originally
referred to the goods themselves and “capital” to the proprie
tor’s principal sum (ownership in the goods). Yet combine these
apparent opposites in a modern business corporation and we have
still a third idea—a legal margin contributed by the shareholders
for the protection of creditors. Today we often drop the noun
“stock” and use the adjective “capital” to mean such diverse
things as (1) the assets themselves, (2) the net worth of the pro
prietor, (3) the legal measure of the limit of dividends.
Obviously there are broad possibilities here for confusion of
thought and action. But the more important matter for the
present purpose is the thought that never in the long development
of organized business and of accounting for business capital has
there been any deviation from the principle that the capital
account recorded the contribution made by the stockholders—
never, that is, until quite recently.
Recent corporation practice in the United States, under the
influence of factors, such as a greatly accelerated vogue for the
corporate form for doing business, an increased appetite since
world-war finance drives for security investments and the rela
tive freedom from restraint which came in with no-par stock,
etc., has evolved the doctrine of stated capital under which the
directors or stockholders designate a portion of the contribution
to be the creditor’s margin and retain unrestrained control over
the disposition of the remainder of the contribution as if it were
accumulated profits.
This is a revolutionary departure from the conception which
has persisted throughout a long evolution.
But a revolutionary practice should not be condemned on the
ground that nothing new can be good. On the other hand mere
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The Journal of Accountancy
novelty should not recommend a practice on the ground that
everything old is inadequate for modern conditions. The use of
a new idea in practical affairs should not alone constitute a suffi
cient endorsement, nor should the existence of abuses constitute
sufficient reason for the abolition of a practice which has inherent
merit. But anything which is as revolutionary as the doctrine
of stated value does call for thoughtful appraisal.
Several alternatives suggest themselves at once. We could go
back to the traditional conception of capital stock as the whole
contribution and thus be free of stated value. We could also
abandon entirely the idea of a fixed sum, however determined, as a
margin for creditors. The first would be equivalent to a repudi
ation of recent developments and would require the restriction of
many current practices. The second would be equivalent to
accepting the revolution as progress and extending it to its
logical sequel.
If we are to hold to the idea that capital stock represents the
whole of the stockholder’s contributions, it probably would not
be necessary to abandon no-par stock entirely. No-par is much
too useful to be legislated out of existence merely because it may
be open to some abuse. No-par stock should be retained for the
sake of its flexibility as an original issue, if for no other reason.
Restriction is needed, however, for stated capital in both
original and subsequent issues. If the whole-contribution con
cept is to prevail, the stated-value concept must give way; the
two are so antagonistic as to be irreconcilable. Therefore, any
statute requiring the whole consideration for an issue of no-par
stock to be credited to capital-stock account must also prohibit
stated value. This will necessitate allowing complete latitude
in the price at which the stock is to be issued.
The use of any statutory minimum price for stock issues would
also constitute a failure to recognize the fact that there is no
relationship whatever between the number of shares and the
value of the property. In a sense a statutory minimum price
constitutes an equivalent of par value as well as an invitation to
establish a “stated capital” by resolution of the directors. If a
minimum price for stock issues is included in the laws in an
attempt to protect the investor against fraudulent stocks, this
sort of protection could more properly be attempted through so
called “blue-sky laws” which would classify shares as types of
investments.
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Another corollary to the fact that the number of owners can not
affect the value of the property is that complete freedom should
exist to increase or decrease the number of shares outstanding, by
stock split-ups and recombinations, and openly to issue shares
for intangibles and promoters’ services. There would be little
objectionable in these practices provided the public were given
unmistakable notice of the facts.
In the case of subsequent issues of no-par stock under a statute
requiring the whole consideration to be credited to capital-stock
account, there might be a question whether this would not con
stitute an impairment of the rights of existing stockholders in the
accumulated surplus. Since every share of common stock new
or old is an undivided interest in the net worth, it might be
argued that part of the purchase price was paid for an interest in
the past surplus and therefore was not a proper credit to capital
account. But since a credit to paid-in surplus or to earned
surplus of a part of a capital contribution would be still more
objectionable, the common-sense thing to do is to ignore the
hair splitting and credit the whole consideration to capital. It
may reasonably be presumed that the stockholders have voted
on the question of the new issue and it will no doubt be agreed
that the ability and the will to see in the proposal a dilution of
existing equities can not be created by statute.
Perhaps these modifications and restrictions of no-par stock
practice would not be sufficient to re-establish the principle of
treating the whole contribution as capital. Recent developments
away from a strict adherence to this earlier concept of capital
stock may indicate a trend which is real progress. If this be
true, then it would be a mistake to attempt to defeat progress in
order to hold to the merely traditional.
Yet the issue may be deeper than the old and the new, the
traditional versus the progressive. Under the earlier practice
corporation finance was principally called upon in the formation
of a new grouping of capital—the creation of a corporation where
none existed before. Under more recent conditions corporate
finance activities have been much more commonly directed
toward merging existing corporations and re-arranging the
capital structure of going concerns. The older problem was
mainly one of assembling aggregates of limited liability capital
under one management and issuing documentary evidences of
the contributions. The newer problem is related to “values,” to
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the growing consciousness that a corporation is being constantly
"appraised” in the security markets, that its securities draw
their value primarily from earning power, that assets are valuable
only according to the earnings they produce. The modern
problem of finance therefore is to try to maintain a reasonable
degree of agreement between a naturally fluctuating element
(value of assets) and a naturally rigid element (limited liability
capital obligations). Hence the search for flexibility of capital
which seems to be behind most of the capital problems of today.
These considerations suggest that a capital flexibility for cor
porations which would approach the flexibility of proprietor’s cap
ital might be desirable, provided the creditors of limited liability
companies were given suitable protection, for creditor protection
is still necessary if business on credit is to continue unabated.
The minimum margin of protection has heretofore been the
capital-stock account representing either the whole contribution
or a designated part of it. But in any event the capital has been
a fixed sum. Obviously flexibility of capital and a fixed sum of
capital are incompatible. So the question appears whether the
creditors might not be given satisfactory protection without the
use of a fixed sum of capital as a margin. If this were accom
plished it should have the effect of making the capital structure
more flexible so far as stock and surplus were concerned.
Assume the following legal restrictions upon corporate capital
stock:
1. In lieu of a fixed sum as a margin for creditors, the corpora
tion shall pledge itself not to allow the relationship between the
total indebtedness (including preferred stock) and the reasonable
value of the total assets to fall below a percentage which the
corporation’s charter agrees to maintain.
2. All preferred stock must have a par value expressing the
liquidation preference in assets, is to be cumulative, callable, non
participating and preferred as to income (in order to exclude
border-line cases which are closer to common stocks).
3. All common stock of whatever class must be without par
value and may be issued for any consideration satisfactory to the
directors and stockholders.
4. The creditors (including preferred stockholders) shall have
the right to elect a certain number (minority) of directors annually.
5. Upon the failure of the corporation to maintain the specified
ratio of assets and indebtedness, the creditors (including preferred
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stockholders) shall immediately have the right to elect a majority
of the directors.
6. Insolvency and the usual seizure through the courts of
assets specifically pledged would follow upon the failure to pay
interest or principal on a bond when due, as at present.
If the assumed restrictions were in force the following would be
some of the expected consequences:
1. A plainer recognition of the principle that all suppliers of
capital differ from one another only as to the terms of their “cap
ital-contract” and that the corporation should be managed with
the interests of all parties receiving consideration.
2. The creditors through their representatives on the board of
directors would have a voice in the management and direct
knowledge of current plans and policies. This representation,
with the enforced maintenance of a definite ratio of assets and
debt and the conditional right to control the policies, would be
an effective substitute for a fixed sum margin and the so-called
trust-fund doctrine of capital stock.
3. With the creditors thus better protected than at present
common-stock account and surplus could be made as flexible as
an individual proprietor’s capital account. The legal necessity
for distinguishing between common stock and surplus would
disappear; a single “net-capital account” would suffice.
4. The “net-capital account” would be a true net worth ac
count, a real indication of residual proprietorship, fluctuating as
proprietorship fluctuated, subject to increase or decrease in the
number of “participation certificates” as the holders saw fit and
to such withdrawals or “assessments” as the directors, represent
ing all suppliers of capital, should decide.
5. Although sub-accounts would be desirable for accounting
purposes, a single account could suffice. It would be credited
with:
Original contributions
Profits earned
Capital gains realized
Appreciation write-ups
It would be debited with:
Asset losses sustained
Asset write-downs
Dividends declared
Reserves transferred to special accounts
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In the past, creditors’ margin was the whole sum contributed
by the stockholders; at present the tendency is toward a directordesignated portion of the contribution, apparently in the search
for greater flexibility of proprietary capital. The proposal here
outlined increases the real protection of all classes of creditors
and at the same time increases the flexibility of proprietary cap
ital accounting and management. On the surface that would
seem to be a desirable accomplishment.
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